

TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND OTHER FORMS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEA
POWER AND FORCE PROJECTION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 2453

TO ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES TO COMBAT
TERRORISM AND OTHER FORMS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

AUGUST 5, 1986

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Crowe, Adm. William J., Jr., U.S. Navy, Chairmar. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.	Page 9
Armitage, Hon. Richard I., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs	17
Shultz, Richard H., Jr., associate professor of international politics, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy	38
Scholtes, Maj. Gen. Richard A., U.S. Army (retired), former commander, Joint Special Operations Command	44

(III)

TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND OTHER FORMS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

TUESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEA POWER AND FORCE PROJECTION,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, in open session, pursuant to other business, at 10:05 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator William S. Cohen (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Cohen, Denton, and Exon.

Staff present: Patrick A. Tucker, general counsel; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, and Patricia L. Watson, professional staff members; Barbara B. Brown, staff assistant.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jay L. Kriss, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; Mary A. Shields, assistant to Senator Stennis; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

[The bill, S. 2453, follows:]

99TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 2453

To enhance the capabilities of the United States to combat terrorism and other forms of unconventional warfare.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 15 (legislative day, MAY 12), 1986

Mr. COHEN (for himself and Mr. NUNN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To enhance the capabilities of the United States to combat terrorism and other forms of unconventional warfare.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS

4 The Congress finds—

5 (1) that the threat to the United States and its
6 allies from unconventional warfare, including terrorism
7 and insurgency, is increasing each year at an alarming
8 rate;

9 (2) that although the United States must continue
10 to maintain and improve its strategic and conventional

1 forces in order to deter aggression and protect the se-
2 curity of both the United States and its allies, the use
3 of force by the United States since the end of the
4 Korean conflict has increasingly been in response to
5 guerrilla insurgencies against allies of the United
6 States and against terrorist attacks directed at the
7 United States;

8 (3) that the use of armed force by the United
9 States in the foreseeable future will most likely be in
10 counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, and other uncon-
11 ventional operations;

12 (4) that the capabilities needed to respond to un-
13 conventional warfare are not those traditionally fos-
14 tered by the Armed Forces of the United States;

15 (5) that the Department of Defense has placed an
16 overwhelming emphasis on planning and preparation to
17 fight a large scale war and, as a consequence, units as-
18 signed counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, and other
19 special operations missions have not been adequately
20 supported, particularly in airlift capability;

21 (6) that the Department of Defense has not given
22 sufficient attention to the tactics, doctrines, and strate-
23 gies associated with those combat missions most likely
24 to be required of the Armed Forces of the United
25 States in the future;

1 (7) that problems of command and control have
2 repeatedly beset military forces of the United States
3 engaged in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency op-
4 erations and other low intensity conflicts;

5 (8) that such problems were evident during the
6 Mayaguez incident, the Iranian hostage rescue mission,
7 the Grenada operation, and the Beirut peacekeeping
8 mission;

9 (9) that the establishment of a unified command
10 for special operations would help to eliminate problems
11 of command and control;

12 (10) that a unified command should be assigned
13 responsibility for coordinating the planning of special
14 operations and for the joint training of units whose
15 principal missions involve counterterrorism, counterin-
16 surgency, or other special operations;

17 (11) that a unified command should also exercise
18 operational control over units whose principal missions
19 involve special operations when such units are not as-
20 signed to other commands;

21 (12) that the establishment of a unified command
22 for special operations will create promotional opportu-
23 nities thereby removing a barrier which has deterred
24 many officers in the past from pursuing careers in the
25 field of special operations;

1 (13) that establishing a unified command for spe-
2 cial operations will facilitate the exchange of informa-
3 tion between special operations units and other com-
4 mands and agencies of the United States;

5 (14) that a unified command for special operations
6 will enhance civilian oversight of special operations and
7 provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
8 civilian authorities with a greater diversity of military
9 advice and options;

10 (15) that the Secretary of Defense has placed in-
11 creased emphasis on increasing the capabilities of the
12 United States to respond to terrorism, insurgency, and
13 other unconventional warfare threats, but, while some
14 progress has been made, the persistence of inadequate
15 service support for units assigned counterterrorist,
16 counterinsurgency, and related special operations mis-
17 sions further emphasizes the need for organizational
18 reform;

19 (16) that the creation of an Assistant Secretary of
20 Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
21 Conflict and a unified command for special operations
22 would greatly improve the effectiveness, funding levels,
23 readiness, force structure, and command and control of
24 special operations forces; and

1 (17) that greater coordination of policies with re-
2 spect to unconventional warfare operations is greatly
3 needed within the National Security Council.

4 SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DE-
5 FENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW
6 INTENSITY CONFLICT

7 Section 136(b) of title 10, United States Code, is
8 amended by inserting at the end the following new para-
9 graph:

10 “(7) One of the Assistant Secretaries shall be the Assist-
11 ant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low In-
12 tensity Conflict. He shall have as his principal duty the over-
13 all supervision of special operations and low intensity conflict
14 affairs of the Department of Defense.”.

15 SEC. 3. REQUIREMENT FOR ESTABLISHING A UNIFIED COM-
16 MAND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

17 Section 124(a) of title 10, United States Code, is
18 amended—

19 (1) by striking out “and” at the end of clause (1);

20 (2) by striking out the period at the end of clause

21 (2) and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and “and”;

22 and

23 (3) by inserting after clause (2) the following new
24 clause:

1 “(3) establish a unified command for special oper-
2 ations forces, unless the President determines such
3 action is not in the national interest.”.

4 **SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF COORDINATING BOARD**

5 Section 402 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
6 U.S.C. 402) is amended by inserting at the end the following
7 new subsection:

8 “(e) The Council shall establish within the Council a
9 coordinating board to be known as the ‘Board for Low Inten-
10 sity Conflict’. The Board shall have as its principal duty the
11 coordination of low intensity conflict policy for the United
12 States.”.

13 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING THE APPOINT-**
14 **MENT OF A DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESI-**
15 **DENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FOR**
16 **LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT**

17 It is the sense of the Congress that the President should
18 establish within the Executive Office of the President the po-
19 sition of Deputy Assistant to the President for National Secu-
20 rity Affairs for Low Intensity Conflict. It is further the sense
21 of the Congress that the President should designate such
22 Deputy Assistant as the chairman of the Board for Low In-
23 tensity Conflict established under section 402(e) of the Na-
24 tional Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(e)), as added by
25 section 4 of this Act.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WILLIAM S. COHEN,
CHAIRMAN

Senator COHEN. On behalf of the subcommittee, I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us here today. Your willingness to work with Senator Nunn and myself on this issue has been greatly appreciated. We welcome your testimony on S. 2453, a measure to enhance the capabilities of the United States to combat terrorism and other forms of unconventional warfare.

This measure, and a similar measure recently approved by the House Armed Services Committee, reflects an increasing congressional concern with the changing nature of warfare and the ability of the United States to cope with these changes.

Throughout most of our history, the predominant form of international conflict has been conventional warfare between the regular armies of the European powers. Our military doctrine and force structure have been overwhelmingly geared toward this type of conflict.

In the period since World War II, however, the nature of warfare has changed. Today, as a result of the success of our nuclear and conventional deterrent, and the instability of many areas of the Third World, warfare is principally characterized by guerrilla insurgencies in the Third World and terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies.

We live in an era which has been described by some as "violent peace." Although the nature of warfare has been changing, its consequences have not. Estimates of the number of battle deaths in the post World War II era vary between 7 and 16 million. While we must remain prepared to deter nuclear and conventional warfare, we must also develop the capability, where possible, to deter unconventional warfare.

In order to deter these new forms of warfare, we need new strategies, doctrines and tactics, and a systematic high-level interdepartmental focus to coordinate the economic, political and social dimensions of our policy. Military assistance to a friendly government beset by a Communist insurgency, for example, is not likely to be effective without corresponding efforts to reduce the economic and political grievances which inevitably accompany such conflicts.

We also need an increased emphasis on our Special Operations Forces. As Secretary Weinberger stated earlier this year, using a relatively new term in the lexicon of warfare, "The particular skills and supporting capabilities which the military offers to the prosecution of low-intensity conflict are chiefly to be found in our Special Operations Forces."

Despite the steps undertaken by the administration to improve the capabilities of our Special Operations Forces, including increases in the number of troops, equipment, and dollars spent, there are underlying organizational problems which cannot be remedied by mere quantitative expansion. Some of the problem areas include: command and control, funding, intelligence support, personnel management, planning and joint doctrine and training.

I believe that if the United States is to be spared the bitter frustration we have experienced in earlier efforts to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations, we must revamp the or-

ganization on which our special forces are built and create a structure for interagency planning for low-intensity conflict.

S. 2453 offers one approach to achieving this objective. This measure currently has 27 co-sponsors, including the distinguished Chairman and ranking members of the Armed Services Committee, as well as the Chairmen of the Intelligence, Appropriations and Judiciary Committees. It also has broad bipartisan support; at the present time there are 13 Republican and 14 Democratic co-sponsors.

The House Armed Services Committee, which has included a provision to create a National Special Operations Agency in its defense authorization bill, offers an alternative approach. We look forward to hearing the views of each of our witnesses this morning on both pieces of legislation.

Admiral Crowe, why don't you proceed.

**STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., U.S. NAVY,
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome this opportunity not only on my own behalf but also on behalf of Secretary Armitage. He and I work closely on this subject. We look forward to testifying and working with you on the future organization of our Special Operations Forces.

As you know, the Department of Defense is moving ahead with a Special Operations Force Command which, I believe comes close to meeting the spirit and intent of Senate bill 2453. But we have not had an opportunity, until today, to discuss the details. So, I intend to focus my testimony on SOF arrangements which appear to be working right from a JCS perspective, areas where we agree with this committee that changes are necessary, and basic characteristics of our new SOF Command.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

First, a few descriptive words about Special Operations Forces are in order:

They are specially trained, equipped, and organized to conduct operations against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national security objectives during peace or periods of hostilities;

They can support conventional operations in either limited or general hostilities or be employed independently when conventional force is either inappropriate or infeasible;

Traditionally, they have been manned by volunteers of high physical and mental agility; relatively free of administrative burdens, very mobile and lightly equipped, and often acting as small units or individuals in hazardous or otherwise unusual missions. They depend basically on hit and run tactics; and

They are not designed to hold ground, to fight toe to toe with conventional forces or to take objectives defended by conventional forces. They are too lightly armed for such tactics.

Today, like other warfare specialists—pilots, submariners, and paratroopers—Special Operations Forces are prepared for combat by their parent services.

SOF ORGANIZATION

With respect to overall SOF organization, I find a mixed picture of things working right and arrangements which could be improved. There is little question that a great deal of progress has been made in the last few years. In 1981, the SOF budget was around \$441 million. The 1987 budget request calls for \$1.6 billion, and the FYDP calls for new equipment across a broad spectrum and market force structure increases.

I seldom hear complaints about the selection, training, and qualification of volunteers. They either make it or drop out depending upon how they are judged by professionals in the business. This up-front quality control is especially important for a force expected to increase in size over the next 5 years.

I have no problems with civilian oversight of activities conducted by our Special Operations Forces. Given their focus on overseas rather than domestic employment, a strong emphasis on regional security, and necessary coordination with the Department of State, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs seems to be a logical place for such oversight to reside.

With respect to in-theater arrangements, I can verify that the CINC's Special Operations Command (SOC) is an appropriate and satisfactory arrangement whereby the CINC normally exercises command and control over Special Operations Forces.

Next, I believe that National Command Authorities (NCA) are generally satisfied with the organization of one small but important element of our Special Operations Forces—JSOC. This element has a high state of readiness, and it can be called into action quickly under a very streamlined national command and control system. I have personally observed the system work under stress and find no reason to change it.

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

At the same time, the JCS agree that Special Operations Forces could be better prepared for combat, especially as a multi-service team, and initiated a review a few months ago to examine the subject from a number of perspectives—for example, from the viewpoint of Congress, OSD, JCS, Service Departments, and CINCs. It quickly became clear that there was considerable confusion among different groups as to what the capabilities of "Special Operations Forces" were and as to what missions they could perform.

With a force growing to 30,000 or more active and reserve personnel, there is a genuine need for much more emphasis on joint or unified training and exercises, a standard SOF Doctrine, developing special SOF equipment, supporting intelligence, and more imagination concerning their combined utility (with other Special Operations Forces or conventional forces of all services) in support of national security objectives. Similarly, today's circumstances require an increasing stress on Special Operations Forces in the professional educational patterns of all services.

We also know that small forces invariably have difficulty competing against larger forces for budget dollars in general and new combat equipment in particular. This problem is going to grow rather than diminish over time, especially if Congress continues a

downward path in real spending for defense. Every warfare community will be circling its wagons and bracing itself against deep cuts in force structure, modernization programs, manpower, and operations and maintenance funding.

For our Special Operations Forces to survive and flourish in this budget environment, more top-level support will be essential. As I understand it, these concerns are very similar to those expressed by members of this committee.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE COMMAND

To meet these challenges, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have now recommended to the Secretary of Defense that a new Special Operations Force Command be created under a three-star general or flag-rank officer. Conceptually, this command would have the following characteristics.

Headquarters for the command would be located in Washington, DC.

The commander would report to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS in the same manner as a unified or specified commander.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would serve as spokesman for the commander or, depending upon the outcome of pending legislation, overall supervisor on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.

Special Operations Forces would be assigned to the command after achieving certain skills at the level of individual or team training which would continue to be a service responsibility.

The new Special Operations Force Command essentially would take the ball from there, preparing all Special Operations Forces to operate jointly.

Such joint preparations would include warfighting concepts, doctrine, SOF-focused military education, training, equipment development, interoperability, and readiness.

The SOFC commander would, of course, be the SOF adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the rare event of an NCA-directed SOF operation that was outside of the charter of JSOC and which was not assigned to a unified commander, the SOFC commander (suitability reinforced) could assume direct control of the operation, if directed to do so.

RESOURCE PLANNING

Turning now to resource planning, the separate services would continue to program, procure, and maintain equipment assigned to or earmarked for Special Operations Forces. Similarly, the services would be responsible for maintaining the personnel pipeline to units assigned to the SOFC. To me, these supporting arrangements make a great deal of sense, especially when you want combat forces relatively free of administrative burdens. Moreover, I see no organizational structure that could cut Special Operations Forces off from service resource and logistic support without becoming prohibitively expensive and creating a completely separate service with all the administrative machinery that involves.

Having concluded that it was necessary to develop initiatives to more closely monitor service support of the Special Operations Force Command and to integrate the efforts of the logistics services into a smoothly working entity.

The Special Operations Force commander will have a major voice in resource planning, following practices now common among unified and specified commands. This includes an early opportunity to review service program objective memoranda, to recommend such changes as he deems necessary, and to attend DRB meetings with unified commanders.

The commander also will have direct access to the Chairman for purposes of voicing requirements, positions, and priorities to be addressed in the Defense Resources Board. Within that Board I have assumed personal responsibility as military proponent for Special Operations Forces.

Additionally, Assistant Secretary Armitage, who already is lashed into planning, programming, and budgeting activities for Special Operations Forces, will join me in monitoring and sponsoring resource requirements of the command. If we trace the problem back to service support, that is where we will seek solutions.

PERSONNEL ASPECTS

With respect to the personnel aspects, the JCS want to see the Special Operations Force preserve its community spirit, with pride in the past and confidence in the future. But, frankly, we are wary of philosophies holding that one community is more important than another. I have seen this approach in the past. In the long run, it does not work. Even SOF people would not all like an elite label if it meant divorcing themselves from their parent services.

We can see that they become more integrated, achieve greater stature as a multi-service community, and receive proper recognition and promotion. We have done it before with other communities. It takes a top-down push. And we are going to give the SOF that push with both the creation of a Special Operations Force Command and the commitment of the Chiefs of service to a more vigorous SOF program.

PLAN OF ACTION

Administrative mechanisms are now in motion to have our SOF reorganization plan in place and functioning within about 6 months. It will take time to shake down such an organization (true of any scheme), but I am firmly convinced that it will work and do so without alienating the SOFs from the parent service.

SUMMARY

To put all of this into perspective:

Many arrangements peculiar to our Special Operations Forces are working well—excellent personnel quality control, civilian oversight within the Department of Defense, command relations within the unified commands, and separate arrangements for JSOC.

At the same time, we all agree that the time has come to develop a new organizational structure which will keep pace with the SOF

revitalization program and the particular needs and concerns of SOF.

The JCS have developed what we consider to be a forward-looking plan of action to deal with these challenges and opportunities. I urge the Congress to give this plan of action a fair chance to succeed.

Nothing prevents us from reviewing the situation annually, near the end of our SOF revitalization program, or whenever Congress considers it necessary to ensure that the SOF community is moving smoothly and effectively into the 21st Century.

That concludes my statement

[The prepared statement of Admiral Crowe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., USN, CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I welcome this opportunity to testify on the future organization of our Special Operations Forces. As you know, the Department of Defense is moving ahead with a Special Operations Force Command which, I believe, comes close to meeting the spirit and intent of Senate bill 2453. But we have not had an opportunity, until today, to discuss the details. So I intend to focus my testimony on SOF arrangements which appear to be working right from a JCS perspective, areas where we agree with this Committee that changes are necessary, and basic characteristics of our new SOF Command.

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With respect to overall SOF organization, I find a mixed picture of things working right and arrangements which could be improved. There is little question that a great deal of progress has been made in the last few years. In 1981, the SOF budget was around \$441 million. The 1987 budget request calls for \$1.6 billion, and the FYDP calls for new equipment across a broad spectrum and marked force structure increases.

I seldom hear complaints about the selection, training, and qualification of volunteers. They either make it or drop out depending upon how they are judged by professionals in the business. This up-front quality control is especially important for a force expected to increase in size over the next five years.

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With respect to in-theater arrangements, I can verify that the CINC's Special Operations Command (SOC) is an appropriate and satisfactory arrangement whereby the CINC normally exercises command and control over Special Operations Forces. We would not want it any other way for global conventional war planning or for

major contingencies short of general war within the Unified Commander's Theater—like those requiring us to: (1) deter state-supported terrorism or subversion, (2) inject various forces to safely evacuate Americans from a country in turmoil, or (3) quickly reinforce a friendly country or government under attack.

Next, I believe that national command authorities (NCA) are generally satisfied with the organization of one small but important element of our Special Operations Forces—JSOC. This element has a high state of readiness, and it can be called into action quickly under a very streamlined national command and control system. I have personally observed the system work under stress and find no reason to change it.

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

At the same time, the JCS agree that Special Operations Forces could be better prepared for combat, especially as a multi-Service team, and initiated a review a few months ago to examine the subject from a number of perspectives—e.g., from the viewpoint of Congress, OSD, JCS, Service Departments, and CINCs. It quickly became clear that there was considerable confusion among different groups as to what the capabilities of "Special Operations Forces" were and as to what missions they could perform.

With a force growing to 30,000 or more active and reserve personnel, there is a genuine need for much more emphasis on joint or unified training and exercises, a standard SOF Doctrine, developing special SOF equipment, supporting intelligence, and more imagination concerning their combined utility (with other special operations forces or conventional forces of all services) in support of national security objectives. Similarly, today's circumstances require an increasing stress on Special Operations Forces in the professional educational patterns of all Services.

We also know that small forces invariably have difficulty competing against larger forces for budget dollars in general and new combat equipment in particular. This problem is going to grow rather than diminish over time, especially if Congress continues a downward path in real spending for Defense. Every warfare community will be circling its wagons and bracing itself against deep cuts in force structure, modernization programs, manpower, and operations and maintenance funding. For our Special Operations Forces to survive and flourish in this budget environment, more top-level support will be essential. As I understand it, these concerns are very similar to those expressed by Members of this Committee.

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ations Forces. Similarly, the Services would be responsible for maintaining the personnel pipeline to units assigned to the SOFC. To me, these supporting arrangements make a great deal of sense, especially when you want combat forces relatively free of administrative burdens. Moreover, I see no organizational structure that could cut Special Operations Forces off from service resource and logistic support without becoming prohibitively expensive and creating a completely separate service with all the administrative machinery that involves.

Having concluded that it was necessary to develop initiatives to more closely monitor Service support of the Special Operations Force Command and to integrate the efforts of the logistics services into a smoothly working entity:

The Special Operations Force commander will have a major voice in resource planning, following practices now common among unified and specified commands. This includes an early opportunity to review Service program objective memoranda, to recommend such changes as he deems necessary, and to attend DRB meetings with unified commanders.

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To put all of this into perspective:

Many arrangements peculiar to our Special Operations Forces are working well—excellent personnel quality control, civilian oversight within the Department of Defense, command relations within the unified commands, and separate arrangements for JSOC.

At the same time, we all agree that the time has come to develop a new organizational structure which will keep pace with the SOF revitalization program, more fully exploit their potential across a spectrum of contingencies, better integrate them as a combined force, and assure that their resource requirements receive top level attention in a fiscally constrained environment.

The JCS have developed what we consider to be a forward-looking plan of action to deal with these challenges and opportunities. This plan may not go as far as some would like and many of the specifics have yet to be fleshed out, but it does have several qualities to commend it:

It affords the Special Operations Forces community an unparalleled opportunity to apply their professional knowledge, skills, and imagination to new warfighting concepts, doctrines, and plans in support of national security objectives;

It provides a greatly expanded and open-ended opportunity to regularly train and exercise as a multi-Service team;

It gives them a voice in the resource planning process they have never enjoyed before; and

Above all, it enjoys strong support from civilian as well as military leadership (of all the Services) within the Department of Defense.

I urge the Congress to give this plan of action a fair chance to succeed. Nothing prevents us from reviewing the situation annually, near the end of our SOF revitalization program, or whenever Congress considers it necessary to ensure that the SOF community is moving smoothly and effectively into the 21st century.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Admiral Crowe. I have a number of questions I would like to direct to you.

First, I will say I appreciate your willingness to work with the committee and Senator Nunn and myself. You have spent considerable time going over some of the details of our proposed legislation. I appreciate your effort to reach the right conclusion.

Before calling on Secretary Armitage, Senator Denton would like to make an opening statement.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you may remember and may have experienced, last year's conference in the House and Senate dealt a great deal with the assignment of Armed Services to drug interdiction problems. I was involved with a number of those discussions. I recently have had some discussions on the Posse Comitatus.

I am concerned, although I commend you for going into what you are going into and I have a lot to learn because you have been discussing this with the Chairman, I do have a vague concern that in our eagerness to cope with things like drug interdiction and the assumed sort of cloak and dagger behind the enemy lines, low level type of military operations that seem to be more predictable in the foreseeable future, I do have a concern that we might possibly be underemphasizing or trending toward underemphasizing the primary and essential roles that the Armed Services must provide. I don't think we have done that yet.

I do have a concern because of some of the conversations that occurred during the conference last year in which I served as a damper not to overdo some of the things which I assure you would bring you nightmares had you heard what some of those programs were.

I am delighted to join with you, Mr. Chairman, and commend you and Senator Nunn for bringing up the crucial issue of the Special Operations Forces, the idea of a Unified Command to undertake to make certain that they are used most efficaciously.

I welcome our witnesses this morning, my classmate, the only remaining uniformed member of the class of '47 and my dear friend, Bill Crowe, and Mr. Secretary Armitage whom I admire. I know firsthand of Bill's many talents and accomplishments and what he says will have great weight with me on this subject.

I come to learn more about the issues because, Mr. Chairman, you don't go into anything halfway and I know you and Senator Nunn together are an extremely formidable and conscientious pair. When you get into a matter, it is not going to be skimpily covered. I am confident of that. I congratulate you.

I hope my opening remarks did not detract any from that last statement. I have a personal and professional interest in combating terrorism, being Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security, as you know.

I am concerned that the FBI, DEA, the Customs Service have the capability to counter terrorism as they are required to do at present, but I am convinced and concerned that there will be military involvement at various levels, highly clandestine war through actions such as air strikes against terrorist installations and structures in Libya.

I would hope in every case, whether it be the Beirut experience or the Vietnam experience, going from a small to an extremely large one, that whatever the military is called upon to do, there is a long-range understanding and resolution among the Government which will sustain, no matter what contingencies occur, the Armed Services in their effort and we just don't tentatively commit and finally lose the lives of many men in the event the issue got too tough.

I know that spirit prevails in the Armed Services. It has a great deal to do with Secretary Weinberger's evident caution about some things as compared to the Secretary of State. I am sure that the Chairman is aware of that. Because of its importance, I do not want to emphasize it because it is involved in what we are talking about today.

I also have sympathy for the Special Operations Forces. I did the eulogies for Bull Simon at Dallas and Pensacola where the funeral services and interment respectively took place and I know that although things didn't work at Sontay, it certainly was a noble and spectacular effort in some respects because it caused them to put all the POWs in one place where it was easier to communicate.

I heard Admiral Crowe's statement. I am persuaded you are moving rapidly and effectively as makes sense and given commitment and progress, the question could arise whether further legislation is really necessary. We do want to avoid micromanagement.

We have just reorganized the entire Department of Defense and it may be that the trend of activity within the Department might shortcut the need for legislation. If they are not responding adequately or if this committee, particularly the Chairman, feels that there is more that can be done, I am certainly openminded about all of that.

I will be listening carefully as the Chairman skillfully conducts this hearing and I look forward to the testimony.

Thank you.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Senator Denton.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD I. ARMITAGE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Allow me, please, on behalf of Secretary Weinberger to thank you for the energies you have directed toward the SOF issue and indeed the spotlight which you and your colleagues in the House, Congressman Daniel, brought to bear on the issue. I think it is much needed and it serves a great purpose.

As we begin our discussions today, I would request that the members of the subcommittee keep two things in mind.

First, all of us here today believe that change must come and come sooner rather than later. As we contemplate change, I think we have to approach it very carefully because in our view ultimately the national security does hang in the balance.

Recent Army studies conducted by the Army War College in Carlisle concluded that the most difficult feature, change or response cannot be addressed by changes in force structure or changes in doctrine. The real change must be one of attitude.

That change in attitude and the need for that change in attitude is what prompted Secretary Weinberger to host his low-intensity conflict conference in January, the first of its kind. It is what prompted the Chairman of the JCS to assume a personal advocacy role for SOF forces. It is what prompted the Secretary of Defense to assign policy oversight to me as Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs.

As we approach this, we all agree change must come, but we have to make sure the change really addresses the need.

Second, I hope all of us in this room can sign up for the following statement, and that is that we want to insulate Special Operations Forces; we do not want to isolate SOF.

Now, we hear a lot about low-intensity conflict. I submit to you that low-intensity conflict is not simply the big war—writ small. I think all of us understand it has special requirements and unique features.

The definition in military publications is that it is a limited political-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, and psychological objectives, often protracted, and ranging from diplomatic, economic, and psychological pressures through terrorism and insurgency.

Low-intensity conflict is often characterized by constraints in weaponry and tactics and constraint in use of violence. That is one definition of low-intensity conflict.

A noted Army historian by the name of Harry Summers prefers a different definition. He calls it collective security. He admits that that term is somewhat flat and uninspired. What he means by collective security is that we are providing for our own security by assisting allies or friends whose stability and whose sovereignty is threatened by insurgency, insurgency which, if successful in gaining political control, will ally itself as an adversary to the United States.

No matter what definition you apply to low-intensity conflict, it is quite clear we are going to need a strategy to address it. Strategy means a lot of different things to a lot of different people. It once was reserved for things generals did to get their forces ready and onto a battlefield where tactics would then come into play.

The term now includes everything from coordination of elements in an advertising campaign to a substitute or synonym for national policy. Plus, you define it very simply as use of engagement for the purpose of war.

I would define it more simply yet. That is, strategy is strictly related to means to an end. That is an awfully simple thing to understand. I submit it is damn difficult to do. That is what we are wrestling with now, Mr. Chairman. We are trying to wrestle with the development of a national strategy in low-intensity conflict.

The strategy is necessarily scenario dependent. It is clothed in ambiguity, as you know so well. It is very much shaped by threat, environment, and public perception. One thing is quite clear, and I think this gets to the point that Senator Denton mentioned. No strategy will be successful where national will is lacking.

General Curtis LeMay, a great American, had a very famous statement. He used to say the dog can take care of the cat, but if he deals with the cat, he can also deal with the kittens. If you apply this to low-intensity conflict, I guess it is an oversimplification which will get you into a lot of problems. It seems to indicate General Purpose Forces are adequate to deal with low-intensity conflict. It is simply not the case, not true.

The other side of the coin is equally wrong. That is, low-intensity conflict is solely the province of Special Operations Forces. I personally know of no Special Operations Forces as shown on television. I do know something about SOF.

I would like to speak here to a specific feature of your bill and that is your call for an Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOF and low-intensity conflict. I would submit that in a way Secretary Weinberger had already recognized a need of that sort. He assigned the responsibility for SOF to me because among our responsibilities in the building, in the Pentagon, are the following:

I am responsible for the political and military relationships with all the countries of the world outside of Europe. That is, those areas where low-intensity conflict is most likely to be seen.

Second, I have responsibility in the building for counterterrorist policy.

I further have the responsibility for the policy oversight of the Defense Security Assistance Agency or the security assistance people. We all recognize that security assistance has a very great role to play in low-intensity conflict.

Finally, I am responsible for the inter-agency coordination between the Pentagon and CIA, National Security Council, and State Department.

I would submit as now structured we are addressing the point you are getting at and the proper place for policy guidance for SOF is to reside with the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs.

The Chairman mentioned proponenty briefly. In the DRB the Chairman and I lead the discussions as proponents for necessary force structure for SOF. We have taken steps rather recently. We have given program 11 status to SOF, we have also established the DRB issue book. These are conditions that are brand new and I think are met with some enthusiasm on the House side. I hope they will be met by you with some enthusiasm.

I am wondering if in some way the suggestion of an assistant secretary solely to deal with SOF is not running somewhat contrary to the drift of reorganization. In my view, it is somewhat, and I believe it runs the risk of some layering. I submit that for your discussion later.

Finally, there has been a charge that what we need is institutions to deal with the problem. We want to get away from having things being personality dependent. Institutions are fine, but in my view everything is to some extent personality dependent.

In the House and Senate we have some very energetic chairmen of committees and chairmen of subcommittees who have embarked their committees and subcommittees in very far-ranging oversight ventures that have been met with great favor and have accomplished great things for the country.

There are some committees and subcommittees who do not have that kind of leadership and do not lead their committees and subcommittees in those types of endeavors. So, though the structure is there, even in the Congress, things are very much personality dependent. I do not think we can ever totally escape from that.

Finally, I want to speak to one element that is not in your bill, but is in the House bill. That is your bill does not contain a separate agency and I very much salute this. I think personally, sir, that an agency would reinforce the subliminal wall between SOF and conventional military, a wall that Admiral Crowe and I have been trying to knock down.

One thing in my mind that assures the success of the system as it is structured is that it involves in a constructive way all the key DOD components. Services have responsibilities for organizing, training and equipping individual elements of SOF and SOF remains integrated in the military command structure through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There are a variety of offices in OSD, most notably ISA and C³I, which bring to the table a common goal regarding SOF. That is SOF in the vernacular is good to go, sir. In short, I believe the future does hold the promise of a united front within the Department of Defense that will assure special operations are ready to succeed.

An institutional change which is totally and completely mandated by Congress could prevent what I see as evolutionary change. With that change I think we are undergoing could come that change in attitude which is so desperately needed to correct the problems that have existed in SOF.

Thank you.

The Chairman has reminded me of program 11 authority that we did give Special Forces programs. This raises SOF to a major force status just like General Purpose Forces or Strategic Forces, things of that nature. It is an assurance that SOF will have every oversight in the DRB and no issue can escape the attention of the Defense Resources Board.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Armitage follows:]

STATEMENT BY RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I am very pleased to be able to join you today to discuss the future of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Clearly, all of us, whether executive or legislative branch, are committed to change and improvement, and I believe we are all convinced that such change must come sooner rather than later. At the same time, we must approach change very carefully, because ultimately the national interest hangs in the balance. Change must address real deficiencies and real short-comings—not perceived ones. As we begin our dialogue, I beg you to keep one thought in mind. We want to insulate Special Operations Forces, not isolate them.

This administration entered office in 1981 convinced that the restoration of our special operations capability was essential. We have been laboring for the last five years to achieve that goal, and we recognize that we still have a great deal to do. In

fact, we are now at the mid-point of the process, and the question really is, is the cup half full or half empty? I prefer to believe that it is half full with the water level rising.

You are all well aware of Secretary Weinberger's deep personal commitment to SOF revitalization, a commitment shared by the White House and Congress. After five years, SOF revitalization remains a high priority, and we remain committed to meeting our 1990 deadline.

We have already come a long way. In 1981, the SOF budget stood at \$441 million. For 1987, we have requested \$1.6 billion—a very real increase both in terms of dollars and in terms of the SOF share of the DOD budget. Readiness is improving, and force structure has expanded with the addition of a special forces group, a ranger battalion, a seal team, and a psychological operations battalion. Both the Seafox and the Dry Deck Shelter have entered service during this period.

We have seen the management of SOF units enhanced by the creation of the 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the Army, and the 23d Air Force in the Air Force.

As part of the foundation for this progress, the joint special operations agency was formed in 1984 to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all SOF matters. Secretary Weinberger has directed that SOF should be the topic for regular and frequent Secretary's performance reviews, and both the Army and Air Force have taken steps to enhance headquarters management—the general officers steering committee and SOF panel, respectively. We have charted our course in SOF master plans that are now being updated.

Recently, Secretary Weinberger directed that I serve as the OSD proponent for all SOF policy matters. This takes into account the fact that my office has cognizance over Special Operations Forces as well as those regions of the world in which they are most likely to be employed. The policy guidance for and advice on deployments of any type stem from this office. The ASD(ISA) has the greatest interest in the development of SOF capabilities as this is the office most likely to need those capabilities as a tool of foreign policy.

As Secretary Weinberger's low-intensity conflict conference last January made clear, the central and most vexing aspect of low-intensity conflict is its ambiguity. The threat is seldom clear—there are few, if any, decisive battles. It is the confluence of political, social, psychological, economic, and unconventional military vectors in which the military component rarely is the most significant. The very definition of low-intensity conflict, emphasizing as it does its constrained, protracted nature, has imbedded in it this ambiguity.

If we are to deal effectively with this threat, we must adopt a sophisticated approach that goes far beyond the application of some mechanistic calculus to the capabilities of opposing forces. That approach must rely heavily on an in-depth understanding of the situationally-specific dynamics that result in the overt manifestation of low-intensity conflict. Since its creation more than thirty years ago, the office of the ASD(ISA) has had precisely the regional expertise needed to understand and deal with those dynamics.

We need to recognize, however, that low-intensity conflict, though most likely, is not the only role for SOF. There is a very real conventional war capability that is an essential force-multiplying complement to general purpose forces. That capability is also the most expensive aspect of SOF, especially the long-range infiltration/exfiltration capacity without which such operations cannot be conducted.

ISA's special planning directorate represents a pool of expertise in SOF policy, programs, and capabilities. Special planning traces its lineage back to a similar ISA office established in 1952 to handle the then-emerging DOD special operations capability. I have already taken steps to increase the size of this activity and have submitted a request for additional personnel to ensure that the office can effectively discharge its responsibilities.

To ensure that ISA's regional and functional expertise are effectively integrated, we have nominated Mr. Larry Ropka to be principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Mr. Ropka retired from the Air Force as a colonel, and his distinguished career focused almost exclusively on special operations. He was, among other things, one of the key planners for the Son Tay raid in 1970.

In short, I believe ISA is uniquely qualified to serve as the Secretary's focal point for SOF.

I want to assure you that I have a very deep, personal commitment to this effort. I am convinced that this is one of the most important things the Department of Defense can, and must, do. Admiral Crowe shares this commitment, as you have heard, and has made SOF revitalization one of his personal top priorities. Together, we are determined that the rest of the SOF revitalization agenda will be realized.

That agenda includes another special forces group, another seal team, 21 new MC-130 combat talons, 12 new AC-130 spectre gunships, 11 newly-modified MH-53J pave low helicopters, 16 MH-60X, and 17 MH-47E, and a brigade headquarters to provide command and control for all Army SOF aviation. Recognizing that the vast majority of rotary-wing aviation resides in the Army, we are also working to ensure an orderly transfer of the SOF rotary-wing mission from the Air Force to the Army.

We, as you, recognize that SOF airlift is one of our most serious deficiencies. Within the last two weeks, this issue has been intensely considered by the leadership of the Department of Defense, including Secretary Weinberger, Admiral Crowe, and the CINCS. We have now undertaken a thorough assessment of requirements and options for meeting them and are determined to provide the best support possible given current fiscal realities. This is expensive. We recognize this, but will do what we must to develop the capability.

All this, I would hope, would demonstrate the strength of our commitment. We recognize that the problems are serious. We recognize that SOF revitalization will involve a series of increasingly difficult choices. We recognize that what has been done to date simply is not enough.

Recognizing the need for further major changes in our approach to SOF, the Joint Chiefs, last December, undertook consideration of a range of options designed to enhance command and control and proponentcy. They have recently concluded their deliberations, Secretary Weinberger has endorsed their recommendations, and I believe the results of their intense debate finally offer us the opportunity to set SOF straight.

Admiral Crowe has already outlined the specifics of the Special Operations Force Command (SOFC). I would like to offer my own observations on the implications for SOF.

All of us, in Congress and in the Department of Defense, are motivated by the belief that special operations must have an effective command and control system and strong advocacy in the resource arena if they are to succeed. We all agree that too often in the past one or both of these essential ingredients has been lacking.

SOFC will correct the command and control deficiency by ensuring that SOF are maintained in the highest state of readiness and, more importantly, prepared for joint employment. Embedded within the command will be eight-to-ten man elements immediately available to the CINCS as augmentation for their special operations commands, and reserve component elements assigned to SOFC will be specifically organized, trained, and equipped to provide the major augmentation needed in war-time.

One key aspect of the Chief's proposal is that SOFC would report to the NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the same manner as the theater unified commands, thus ensuring that all military operations remain properly integrated. It is almost a truism that special operations cannot be conducted without a significant measure of support from conventional forces. Similarly, in most cases SOF and conventional forces operate in a complementary fashion. Thus, it is essential that we not bifurcate these two elements of our military power through the establishment of command and control mechanisms that would run counter to the concept of unity of command.

At the same time, we must consider the sensitive political nature of most special operations. While command and control is a military function, planning for and conduct of special operations, must take that sensitivity into account. This argues strongly for an OSD role that would be unusual under most other circumstances.

On the advocacy side, the commander of SOFC will carry the same weight as the CINCS in the deliberations of the defense resources board. Coupled with my responsibilities in this area, as well as those of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C³I and the personal commitment of Admiral Crowe, one can start to see the extent to which SOF advocacy has become an institutional reality. In addition, we have taken steps to improve our institutional capacity to manage SOF resources through creation of a major force program category—program 11. By identifying SOF resources separately within the FYDP, we will facilitate increased management attention and identification of problem areas. We plan to have this new program fully integrated into the FYDP within six months. Finally, we are establishing a separate SOF issue book that will further increase the visibility of SOF during review of the service and defense agency programs.

The one thing, in my mind, that ensures the success of this system is the fact that it constructively involves all the key DOD components. The services retain responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping the individual elements of SOF, and SOF remain integrated into the military command structure through the JCS. A variety of offices in OSD, chief among them ISA and C³I, bring to the table varied

interests and perspectives but a common goal with regard to SOF. In short, the future holds the promise of a united front within DOD that will ensure that special operations are ready to succeed.

We know that you share our concerns about and determination to resolve SOF issues. The strength of our conviction is made clear in S. 2453, a bill to enhance the capabilities of the United States to combat terrorism and other forms of unconventional warfare.

As you know, there are striking similarities between your proposal and the steps already taken by DOD. We both support creation of a command to ensure that SOF are maintained in high state of readiness to undertake joint special operations. We both seek to ensure that SOF are adequately supported by providing for a system of strong advocacy at the decisionmaking levels of DOD. We agree on the issues that underlay the need for SOF reorganization.

At the same time, I believe we share the view that it would be far better for DOD to solve the problem that for Congress to impose a legislated solution. One inescapable reality is that regardless of how we ultimately reorganize SOF, they will remain a part of DOD, and, more specifically, they will continue to rely on their parent services for their lifeblood. While the impact of S. 2453 would be essentially identical to that of the DOD initiatives, I am concerned that such an imposed solution will serve to reinforce the subliminal wall between SOF and the rest of the military that we have been laboring over the last five years to dismantle. Clearly, we must prevent a recurrence of the debilitating neglect of the past. Equally clearly, we must avoid divorcing SOF from the rest of the DOD family. So, in deriving a solution, I want to reiterate that our objective must be to insulate, not isolate, SOF.

I believe the Special Operations Force Command and the other initiatives we have undertaken do just that, and they do so with the full and strong support of DOD's military and civilian leadership. I urge your support.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, I will come back to you in a moment.

With respect to the statement about the importance of personality, I recall from my old law school days, a book Justice Cardozo wrote called "The Nature of Judicial Process." It has a footnote. The footnote says something to the effect in the long run there is no guarantee of justice except the personality of the Judge.

I am not sure I would like that comment to be aired over at the Rehnquist hearing, but there is great truth to that; notwithstanding all the judicial structure we establish, ultimately, it is the personality of the Judge, his background and his particular philosophy, that prevails throughout.

Admiral Crowe, let me raise a couple of questions.

Again, I commend both of you gentlemen for trying to work with us on the committee to formulate a policy to deal with what we believe to be the coming reality.

In fact, the most probable type of conflict will not be a major conventional battle, notwithstanding "Red Storm Rising." The likelihood is that low-intensity conflict that both you gentlemen have described.

One concern I have, Admiral Crowe, is that I am not convinced that an ambiguous command is the answer to an ambiguous type of warfare. There are no department regulations, no statutes which would govern the operations of the new command envisioned by the JCS, whereas if you had a unified command, we already have in process a procedure to establish rules and regulations that would define the relationships within the command and between it and other commands.

It seems to me that, again coming back to the personal aspect, you have made a commitment to make this work and see to it that more resources are devoted, but that is primarily dependent on your personal relationship with that new command. There is no

guarantee at all that it would endure beyond you or the next Chairman or someone beyond Secretary Armitage.

What Senator Nunn and I are concerned about is setting up a structure that will endure beyond you and your successors.

Admiral CROWE. Mr. Chairman, if I could speak to those for a moment.

First of all, I would not concur it was an ambiguous answer to an ambiguous problem. We will do everything in our power to make sure this command is firmly defined and in no respect ambiguous.

It is true, of course, that we do not have within the standard definitions of JCS Pub 1 a definition that covers this. That seems to me to be giving a lot of credence to JCS Pub 1. I am not sure this is the final answer to all the military problems in the world. It is our intention to define this.

Incidentally, we can change JCS Pub 1 very easily. We can make a definition that will cover this and we plan to do so. That does not strike to the heart of your concern.

There are a couple of reasons we did not go the unified command route, and, incidentally, we considered it very seriously. We considered a couple of alternatives, a separate unified command, making it a part of the present unified command and also a sub-unified command alternative.

We felt that, number one, the character of the Special Forces—what they do, the way we wanted to do it, the special visibility that we wanted to give it—really did not lend itself to the current unified command structure either in terms of size or character, what it did, et cetera, et cetera.

For example, there are two or three conditions in our proposal that go further than the current unified command. For example, it would be stationed in Washington. The commander would be the personal adviser on that particular expertise to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No unified commander does this sort of thing.

Not only that, it would have its own program 11 for POM purposes or budget purposes which no unified command has. It would have a SOF issues book in the DRB process. These are all things that distinguish it from the unified command and give it a special character of its own. We felt it should have a special character in the way we set it up, et cetera.

In regard to your questions or your concerns about the guarantee, in my own personal relationship, this, of course, will be related to the Chairman, whether in my term or my successor's. I would submit for your consideration that once this command is created, that it is going to have a constituency of its own and probably will have a building of constituency on the outside of this committee who will have a very deep interest in Special Operations Forces, not only today, but in the future.

It will certainly have a constituency in the Pentagon, not only on the military side, but on the civilian side of the house. It will be interested not only in the effective functioning of this command, but also its survival. All of these things will act in terms of making sure that it persists.

To be frank, we are not very good at eliminating commands once we get them in the Pentagon. They seem to acquire a life of their

own and I am not sure that that is unhealthy. I do not share the concerns you express.

Conversely, I cannot give you a guarantee of anything. It is like a bill passed in this Congress which could be amended next year.

Senator COHEN. There was considerable opposition to the creation of the unified command for the Rapid Deployment Force. It was through both the Marines and Navy that we were successful in establishing that command. I think we are better off as a result of it.

Admiral CROWE. There was certainly a lot of controversy in the Pentagon. We have a lot of issues, but we have a lot of controversy over there.

Senator COHEN. What about the Army?

In the past the Army had proposed creating a separate unified command.

Have you had discussions with General Wickham?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, I have.

Senator COHEN. How does the Army feel about the desirability of a new command?

Admiral CROWE. The current Army leadership thinks it is a very fine idea. We have had strong support from the Army. We have the support of the Chiefs. We have briefed the CINCs on this. I think we are going forward with CINC concurrence.

Senator COHEN. I understand the CINCs were opposed to the creation of a separate unified command because they were under the misapprehension that somehow they were going to lose operational control, once those units were assigned to their theater.

Admiral CROWE. I think it was in their minds. There was concern in the early stage, when the legislation was forming that they might lose control and particularly if a separate agency was established, it would control even those forces operating within the CINCs theater.

Senator COHEN. Are they clear on that issue now?

Admiral CROWE. I believe they are.

We had all the CINCs in Washington a few days ago. We have gone over this in some detail. I should say in the study that we did, where we considered a number of alternatives, we solicited all the input of the CINCs.

To be fair to the CINCs, I think their general attitude is that they would prefer the status quo. But we attempted to factor in, and, incidentally, their concerns were not identical, depending on what theaters we were addressing. We attempted to address all their concerns. We did not meet every one, but met the bulk of them.

When we came out with this proposal, "we" being the JCS, we had an opportunity a few days ago to discuss at some length with the CINCs not only what their concerns were, but also what we were doing in Special Forces, and also the climate back here in Washington regarding this subject.

I think we have a general consensus now, not only among the Chiefs.

Senator COHEN. Does the unified commander report directly to you or go directly to the Joint Staff?

Admiral CROWE. They report to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Chairman, through me. I deal with unified commanders every day.

Senator COHEN. Would this new command do the same?

Admiral CROWE. Yes. In all fairness, there are many features of the command we propose that are identical to what a unified commander does.

In my statement I said I would either oversee or supervise, depending on what language came out of the reorganization bill. That language refers to the unified command. This command will be treated in the same manner in the DRB process, although it has a little more prerogative in terms of the DRB issues book and in terms of program 11.

His relationship with the Chairman would be identical to the unified commander except it would be closer for two reasons.

Number one, he is in Washington.

Number two, he serves as personal adviser to the Chairman for SOF matters which is not really identical to what a unified commander does.

Senator COHEN. You touched on, in your opening statement, the need for promotional opportunities for Special Operations Forces personnel. The track record has not been very good to date. In fact, the three top officers in charge of Special Operations today were appointed without any real field or company grade experience in Special Operations.

So, we have been sending them a signal that if you want to get ahead, that is not the area where you want to go. That is one of the problems we discussed during the Defense Reorganization bill. We were concerned about service on the Joint Staff. The testimony kept coming through it is a dead end as far as your career is concerned, avoid it at all cost.

That is not exactly what we felt we ought to be promoting. The same thing applies here as well.

What is it in your particular approach that will enhance promotional opportunity?

Admiral CROWE. I would like to say a couple things about that, Mr. Chairman.

Number one, I have heard this criticism since I have been dealing with this issue. I have attempted to look into it, at least in a simplistic way, if not a totally scientific way.

I think, first of all, the Special Forces business is young and it is a little early to conclude a lot of things about it through experience. It is a small organization, so even if we promote a proportionate share, you would not have many people because of the small numbers.

That is really not the biggest problem in the promotion of Special Forces people. I have a Special Forces officer with me today, a colonel, and he and I discussed this very question yesterday.

If I can take some liberties, Colonel Russell, I will quote some of the things you said. He is not only a Special Forces officer and came up through that system, he has sat on boards that were looking at people for promotion and had an opportunity to sample the experiences of Special Forces officers.

Senator COHEN. Is he on the list of the 2,800 or so we had today?

Admiral CROWE. His reaction was where Special Forces officers have performed well, not only as Special Forces officers, but as basic soldiers, their promotion rate has been equal to and in most cases higher than their counterparts in conventional forces.

The real problem in SOF promotion has been when an officer insisted on staying in SOF and doing nothing else over a long, long period of time. Incidentally, that will jeopardize your promotion, no matter what speciality you are in, aviation, parachute, submarine, destroyer, or anything else, particularly when you come to the flag and general officer ranks.

I think of all the subjects we are going to discuss today, this particular one applies more to what Secretary Armitage said about attitude than any other. If you are going to correct the promotional problem, You have to correct the attitudinal problem throughout the service. They have to be accepted not only as proficient in their own line, important in their own line, but also as part of the overall situation.

We have made some headway in that regard and we are going to make some more. This will be a step forward because we are proposing a solution that we believe not only enhances the prestige of the Special Forces, but still operates inside the structure.

I said in my statement you will have top-down support to do this.

Mr. ARMITAGE. I would like to get your permission to submit for the record what the Army does in the Special Operations Forces career field.

I asked the question that you just asked about promotions. I was surprised. I thought they would be worse than they are.

I would like to put the information in the record to show you that the Army says the Special Forces career field promotion rates are compared with the Army in general as well as the service school attendees. I think they are quite surprising.

I must say I want to go back and be sure of my figures. With your permission, I will submit that for the record.

[The information follows:]

PROMOTION SELECTION RATES FISCAL YEAR 1985 PROMOTION ZONE

[In percent]

Grade	Special forces career field	Army
Colonel	75	48
Lieutenant colonel	75	75
Sergeant major	41	26
Master sergeant	73	19
Sergeant first class	44	15

SCHOOL SELECTION RATES FISCAL YEAR 1985 TOTAL CONSIDERED

[In percent]

School	Special forces career field	Army
Senior service college	9	4
Sergeants major academy	18	12

Senator COHEN. We will operate under the 10-minute rule.

Admiral CROWE. Mr. Chairman, if I may add, we are sensitive to that problem and the Chiefs are all concerned.

Senator COHEN. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and Admiral Crowe, welcome today. We are pleased to have you on this most important subject. I think you know that those of us who have oversight responsibility in this area here are not trying to run things; we are just trying to explore a concern that I think has been expressed to us by many of our constituents.

I do not believe there is an understanding among our people as to the detailed role of the Special Operations Forces and how they are employed today. But our citizens recognize how important these forces are today. They are increasingly concerned about what we are going to do to strengthen our Special Operations Forces.

I guess the American people have the perception that this Senator seems to share. That is, in the foreseeable future, it looks to me like we are going to be in a situation in which we do not have war, but we do not have peace either. By that I mean we are continually threatened with terrorist type activities. I expect this situation to continue for quite some time.

As you said in your statement, Admiral, the larger units are frequently given better consideration in the budget than some of the Special Operations Forces. That is one of the things we are trying to correct with the help of both you gentlemen.

It just seems to me that possibly not enough attention is being given to our Special Forces. I think you are trying and I am not critical of you at all. I am just saying I hope you understand that those of us here under the leadership of Senator Nunn and Senator Cohen are trying to highlight the needs of our Special Operations Forces so that they are recognized and adequately funded.

I guess you know this is an expression of the concern that we have here on this subcommittee. I think that goes for the Armed Services Committee as a whole.

Let me ask a specific question that I do not think has been asked yet.

What role do either of you see for Special Operations Forces in combating drug trafficking? What role will the Special Operations Forces be playing in this effort or is there not going to be a major role for the Special Operations Forces?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Whether it is an essential role or not, I cannot say. I can say Special Operations Forces have a role in that battle, particularly in the training aspects of it, using training techniques that will allow other countries to combat terrorism as well as narcotics.

Frankly, in many of the countries, if you are dealing in Central and South America, which have a large drug problem and large drug product, SOF if they are brought to bear will have to work with local forces to teach them how to deal properly with the populace. These are all things that SOF do as a matter of course.

They have a role. Whether it is a central role, I cannot commit myself now.

Admiral CROWE. I reflect what Secretary Armitage has said. Special Operations Forces will find a number of areas as we get into this and the subject is treated.

I would like to emphasize it is a sort of analogy to limited-intensity conflict, that there is also a role in many aspects of drug enforcement for conventional forces. We see it every day in the Army, Navy, and Air Force current contributions. For example, in these exercises we have had in the Caribbean and for interception of drug traffic at sea, et cetera, et cetera. Also in the training of other people in those drug interdiction activities that are akin to counterinsurgency, I think Special Operations Forces will play a role and an increasing role.

Mr. ARMITAGE. It is very clear to us that there is a direct relationship with the drug trafficking. That being the case, we will have to bring all our resources to bear in the fight against it.

Senator EXON. Did the Special Operations Forces play any role in the activities we have going on in Central and South America right now, or do these involve the regular forces?

Are there Special Operations Forces involved in that operation?

Mr. ARMITAGE. In Bolivia?

Senator EXON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ARMITAGE. No, sir, they are not. These are regular helicopter units and those operations are structured so that the transportation people who are our people have careful rules of engagement so that we think they will not be in combat. It is just not that kind of activity.

The actual operation, raiding a site, et cetera, is being handled by the Bolivians as well as some of our drug enforcement agency people.

Senator EXON. Let me follow up with this next obvious question.

Supposing that the determination was made by the President that in a certain area in Bolivia or somewhere else that our forces might be called into combat to interdict or destroy drug operations clandestinely.

Admiral CROWE. At the request of the local authorities?

Senator EXON. Yes. If that happened, would that likely involve Special Operations Forces or would it be handled by the regular forces such as those that are now operating in Bolivia?

Admiral CROWE. It would depend on the character of the operation, Senator.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions at this time.

Senator COHEN. Senator Denton.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, could you tell us if there is a formal position of the Department of Defense respecting S. 2453, the bill being considered in this hearing, and if so, would you give us your personal exceptions to that bill, if you have any.

Admiral CROWE. I will say a word, Senator, and will ask Secretary Armitage to address the OSD part, the oversight part of the bill.

We feel, first of all, that S. 2453 is very close to the solution that we are currently pursuing. I know that there are some differences.

Our own view, at least at this juncture, is that we have met the basic concerns, we believe the basic concerns of this committee and the Congress. We are certainly reasonably disposed toward any other suggestions and there is no need for legislation at this time, that is the JCS view.

Now, I am talking about primarily our SOFC command, itself, close enough to the unified command solution that is envisioned in S. 2453 that I can make that statement.

There is another important part of that proposed bill which has to do with civilian oversight which I would like to have Secretary Armitage discuss.

Mr. ARMITAGE. I gave up one of my human rights when I took this job, that is, to have personal opinions. I will submit to you the Department's opinion, sir.

That is on the question of Assistant Secretary of Defense, a separate Assistant Secretary for SOF in IOC, we feel what you wanted to accomplish in that group has already been accomplished by the Secretary's decision to shift responsibility from SOF to me.

I am the person who has responsibility for those countries where low-intensity conflict is most likely to appear. I do have policy oversight for security assistance, responsibility for counterterrorism. I am the central point for coordination between the agencies.

Having said that, I agree with the Chairman. The bill you are suggesting is very close to what we have already done. Frankly, I would be disingenuous if I did not say we were looking at what you had done very much as we shaped our own plans.

Senator DENTON. I wonder if there is coincidence between the actions you have been taking or are in the course of taking and the legislation.

In other words, should I be asking you what took you so long? Did it take the threat of legislation to get the Department off the dime on those actions or is the legislation incidentally close to what you have been doing?

Admiral CROWE. That is an interesting question, Senator.

Senator COHEN. You can take the Fifth Amendment on that one if you like.

Admiral CROWE. I think it is a combination. First of all, Special Operations Forces is becoming more of a concern in the Department itself. You can see that by the increase in investment. To say the interest of this committee has not had a role in it would be disingenuous. Very definitely it had a role. Our learning curve may be shallow, but it is not completely flat.

Mr. ARMITAGE. We are not all bad. We said look at the record and the record is not all bad. We have made budgetary changes. We have made structural changes, ourselves, as we have gone along this path.

As the Chairman said, sure, legislation has a great catalytic effect.

Admiral CROWE. The concerns of the committee are very legitimate and we share them and particularly as the JCS have reviewed it in their recent study.

Senator DENTON. I have acquiescence that there are a few things in favor of contributing to oversight from the point of view of this

committee. I am afraid I am prejudiced that there is more micro-management. I admit to that prejudice.

There is more assumption that the Armed Services are a bunch of stupid and stubborn dyed-in-the-wool guys, not on this committee because they come in more contact, just among the holdover effects of 1974, 1975 military feeling. There is some in this body.

We heard a lot about inter-service rivalry during the past few years. We have had people make a big thing of Grenada and the main significance of it was the Army, Navy, Marines each wanting part of something that could have been done by any one and things like that which I think is unfair. It is human nature to want to get into it and it probably would have taken all three.

How about among the various Special Operations Forces? There is a competitiveness among them which is healthy. They are committed to excellence.

Is there a problem in competition for resources or in duplication of capability and efforts among the Special Operations units?

Admiral CROWE. As opposed to the conventional forces or among themselves?

Senator DENTON. As a special case in themselves. Is it a great service rivalry, intercompetitive thing that is harmful or is it good? Is that a major factor or not, SEAL versus Special Operations Forces, for example?

Admiral CROWE. I think that the increased emphasis and increased attention and also increased stress on jointness have moderated a great deal of that competition that might have existed between Special Operations Forces.

In the SEAL example they do different functions. They are not exactly the same. This helps to tamp down the competition. They have learned to work together very well. There is obviously a competition between Special Operations Forces and conventional forces.

Incidentally, in today's budget climate there is competition between every element of the military and every other element. They are circling the wagons in the Pentagon, so to speak. We have to live with that. That is one of the things we hope to do in our restructured proposal, to make the Special Operations Forces competitive in that environment.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. Where do the SEALS and JSOC come under this new organizational plan?

Admiral CROWE. As far as direct operational line, JSOC we would remain just where it is. In terms of training, in terms of interoperability of equipment and doctrine, there would be an administrative line between JSOC and SOFC. For command and control we have looked at it very closely and felt the streamline system we have now for the specialized type of work JSOC does we were afraid to tamper with.

Senator COHEN. JSOC would be administered under?

Admiral CROWE. Not administered under, but administratively in contact on doctrine, training exercise, readiness, interoperability, development of equipment, which SOFC would have responsibility for. There would be close contact all the time, but the reporting chain would remain undisturbed.

Senator COHEN. When General Wilson testified before the House, he made the point that 1 out of 10 or possibly 1 out of 20 general officers understood the capabilities of Special Operations Forces.

Was he exaggerating that point?

Part of the difficulty we have is that we are still looking at a structure dominated by those in the conventional field who do not have a good understanding of the capabilities and the utility of Special Operations Forces.

When you look at the unconventional tactics and doctrine necessary, you have a mismatch between your capabilities and what might be required.

Admiral CROWE. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I again would not want to mislead anyone. There is some misunderstanding of SOF within the military. There is a great misunderstanding outside the military. Every place I go it is like the old story about the elephant: Whatever part you feel, that is what it is all about.

You see Special Operations Forces operating as trainers in foreign countries and that is what they do, they operate as counterterrorism.

Incidentally, many things they do you do not see in the popular press today. I am talking about the coordination they do with the conventional forces and planning in larger hostilities. We have Special Operations Forces in both Europe and the Pacific that are trained for long-range reconnaissance, for intelligence gathering, attacking targets behind the scene. This requires very heavy, specialized forces.

Special Operating Forces are heavily involved in that. That is not counterterrorism and it is not training of foreign troops, and so forth. It is very diverse and difficult to understand and I do not think 1 out of 20 is the correct figure.

Senator COHEN. Is it higher?

Admiral CROWE. No. It is getting less every day.

Mr. ARMITAGE. The general thrust of his statement is that maybe general officers or officers in general do not understand the use of SOF, which is something that concerned Secretary Weinberger sometime ago. He wanted a review of our courses in our professional service schools and academies, to make sure that the curriculum contained the proper amount of instruction on SOF.

I think the general thrust of General Wilson's comment is something that Secretary Weinberger already recognized.

Senator COHEN. One of the arguments I have heard about not creating a Special Operations Forces Command is that this is an exaggeration of their role, importance, and needs.

It seems to me the justification for a separate command should not depend on budget or resources or historical roles, but on a comparison of that particular service or force to the need. I'll try to put it in more simple terms. If your communications were all shut down and you had to get a message to one of your field commanders, you had two things available, a homing pigeon and you had a hawk. What would you choose?

You would pick the homing pigeon, I assume. The hawk might get there faster if it got there. It might kill a few things on the way, but it might never arrive.

It does not matter how big it is or tough it is or how strong the particular need might be, it has to be tailored to the specific use.

In my judgment, if you are looking at the future or even the present, Special Operations Forces certainly should command greater status based not on resources consumed, the importance of the missions they perform.

Admiral CROWE. We occur in that basically. That is a major finding of the JCS review of this subject, that:

Number one, it was an important subject.

Number two, it took specialized effort and training outside of the main stream.

And, number three, there were several areas that needed more attention and we needed some special organization to give that attention.

Senator COHEN. Let me read a quotation from Major Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. He says that:

There exists today no persistent high-level emphasis for the development of an interdepartmental approach to the problem of foreign internal defense. . . . With the structural void such as that which exists today comes scarcity of resources and/or incentives necessary to motivate the Army to overcome its institutional bias and inertia and develop a true capability for foreign internal defense contingencies.

He goes on to say:

In the absence of a national security framework that addresses the interdepartmental obligations associated with foreign internal defense operations, it is presumptuous for the political leadership to believe that the Army (or the military) alone will develop the capability to successfully execute U.S. security policy in Third World countries driven by insurgency.

It is a long statement, but it is designed to raise the issue of your proposed solution to this problem. It does not deal with the NSC, as we had envisioned in our particular proposal.

Senator Nunn and I went over this over and over again. We would like DOD and the administration to do it without legislation. In fact, I am going to introduce an amendment today. We are going to try to offer it on the defense bill.

It will probably be a sense of the Senate, but we do want to see if we cannot give the Department an opportunity to make more changes than you have made today before we have to confront Congressman Daniel in the authorization conference.

But your proposal does not deal with some sort of high level coordination within the NSC, itself, which is one of the things our bill is trying to do. I think you and the Secretary talked about this, not necessarily in military items, but in coordinating the political, the economic, the international aspects.

There does not seem to be any real central focus in NSC at this point. I will not ask you to give your personal views.

Mr. ARMITAGE. This is one I thought I might give my personal views, making a liar out of me because of my previous statement.

In a way we have coordination. In a way we do our business.

Senator COHEN. Let me interrupt you.

How many people do you have in your shop right now on a full-time basis?

Mr. ARMITAGE. In general or SOF?

Senator COHEN. SOF.

Mr. ARMITAGE. I have seven. Three from other agencies, the Secretary of Defense has given me two more.

Senator COHEN. The seven are full time?

Mr. ARMITAGE. The seven are full time. The other three from agencies are full time, too. The Secretary has recently given me two more positions which I have yet to fill. In addition, I have hired a fellow who planned the Sontay raid to be Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. That level is as high as I have in ISA.

I might add that is from basically nothing in 1981.

Senator COHEN. You are formulating policy, I assume, but the budgetary aspect, Donald Latham has at least the appropriation part?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Certainly in C³I and other things. In the DRB, as you are aware, the major consideration was the airlift issue. The Chairman and I led the discussion.

In a way we do have coordination. If a problem occurred in a country, in Central America, which would call into play SOF, I would naturally deal with Mr. Abrams and with Mr. Burkhart at the NSC. We do not cut the NSC out of anything.

What you are suggesting as I read your bill is a specific office. They certainly have the structure at NSC to be able to do that. It would not be a bad idea, frankly. It would require, however, that that office maintain very close liaison with the NSC officers who are directly responsible for regional affairs.

Senator COHEN. We need to get away from operating on an ad hoc basis when an emergency comes up. Too often when something comes up, we put people out in the field without any kind of forethought. If we are looking at these sorts of problems in the present or future, it seems to me we ought to have something in a continuous—

Mr. ARMITAGE. That is not a bad idea. Most of my colleagues, we have no structure at all. We do have what we call a CPPG, a crisis pre-planning group. We sit on it. They are called into play when anything comes up. Among the things we discuss are employments, the type of which you are speaking.

Admiral CROWE. Since I have been here, that mechanism has handled our deployment.

Senator COHEN. Let me talk a bit about airlift. Last year the Defense Authorization Act required the Secretary of Defense to determine the airlift requirement for the Joint Special Operations Command and for Special Operations Forces.

Do you believe the Secretary's certification is a valid assessment of the requirements for JSOC and SOFC?

Admiral CROWE. What we were asked for was compilation of the united commander requirements. It does represent that, Mr. Chairman.

As a result of the DRB process, we are once again, "we" being the JCS and also the Assistant Secretary, taking a close look at those requirements to see if we feel they are absolutely firm and valid.

I think I can speak for Rich, we both believe we need a much heavier commitment to Special Operations Forces airlift.

Mr. ARMITAGE. I might add we are going to get a much better commitment. It was clear from the discussion in the DRB.

Senator COHEN. The committee is receiving some reports that the Air Force and Army are not complying with the guidance given by the Secretary of Defense. These reports indicate that Air Force budgeted \$3.5 million too little to accomplish its forces' certified plan.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Let me clarify. The airlift report was submitted on April 1. Our DRB submissions had to be completed on April 11. We could not put the required entries into our DRB submissions by April 11. However, the Chairman and I led the discussion of the SOF airlift issue in the DRB. I might add an hour and 40 minutes worth, which is a long time to be on the podium.

The money was not sufficient in the FYDP to fund the whole area. This is no secret. That is what the discussion was about. There will be a significant amount of money added. How much, I do not know yet and I cannot say. That is secret.

We had not put the necessary budgetary paperwork into effect to complete the airlift enhancements by 1991, at the time of our DRB submissions.

Senator COHEN. Does DRB have the power to direct the services to comply with the Secretary's certification?

Mr. ARMITAGE. The DRB certainly has the power. That is exactly what happens on issue after issue.

Senator COHEN. Do we have the same number of PAVELOW helicopters that we had at the time of the Iranian rescue mission?

Mr. ARMITAGE. We have nine now. We have others on the way. We have one less because of an accident.

Senator COHEN. Senator EXON.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Grenada operation was successful, but we have had hearings that indicate it could have been done differently and probably better.

If we were to undertake a Grenada type operation tomorrow somewhere, what can you tell us in open session as to how things would be done differently? Would the Special Operations Forces plan a more major role than they did in Grenada?

Admiral CROWE. More immediate or more effective role?

Senator EXON. Use your words, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. First of all, Senator, I am no authority on Grenada. I was not in a place where I could be authoritative, but we have learned a great deal from our Grenada experience. I would argue that we have made many changes in the way we did our business then, that we would do our business differently today if we had to do a Grenada.

Unfortunately, Grenada was done under great time pressures and that may happen again. I do not guarantee we will not have that problem in some places where we had not planned for. That is one thing you can count on, you will be asked to do something you had not thought about and asked to do it very quickly.

As far as Special Operations Forces are concerned, many things have changed. We have a number of organizations we did not have then. We have within my staff a Special Operations Agency. We have learned that you do not opsec Special Forces out of those operations. They are the best you have, with expertise, they have to be in on the planning at the very outset.

We would do it more effectively than we did then, a great deal more.

Senator EXON. Does the Secretary have anything to say on that?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I was involved in the decision to deploy forces in Grenada and I am happy with the way it turned out. It was successful.

I completely agree we would do things better now. It has been a while since we have deployed a force.

Senator EXON. If we were going to have another Grenada tomorrow and if we had areas that should be secured early in the operation with whatever forces necessary, and I am referring primarily to the protection of the students in the Grenada example, that were not protected for several hours, would we be more likely to send Special Operations Forces in to secure such sensitive objectives?

Would we be likely to use Special Operations Forces in that kind of circumstance should it repeat itself?

Admiral CROWE. Senator, can I hark back to my statement in that regard? I think it is important to understand that this is very scenario driven. Special Operations Forces have some tremendous capabilities, but they also have some tremendous limitations of things they cannot do.

For example, I said in my statement they cannot stand toe to toe with conventional forces.

Senator EXON. What conventional forces were there in Grenada?

Admiral CROWE. I am talking about the situation, whatever it is. It depends on when you say take students, protect them, secure them, it depends on what you are up against.

If you are up against an organized force, and I am talking about small units, I am not talking about complicated tanks or anything, I am talking about a battalion of infantry or company of infantry with normal armament that a conventional company would have where it does not lend itself to hit and run, where you come in to do what you have to do and get out of there, then you have to have something besides Special Operations Forces.

In a situation where you must move quickly and surprise and quickness are your strength, then we would use Special Operations Forces definitely.

I hope I did not mislead you a moment ago on drug enforcement. We would use Special Operations Forces if we felt that was the scenario that was dictated. We have no hesitancy about using those.

If it was a transportation function that could be done by other organizations without specialized equipment and there is not much danger, we would use them. We would use whatever was necessary for that approach. That is the stuff of my business, to decide what is more appropriate at the time, given the circumstances.

Senator EXON. Thank you. No further questions.

Senator COHEN. I have no further questions. We will move on.

I just want to mention a couple of things. Senator Denton was asking whether or not the Pentagon or DOD was responding to congressional pressure in shaping its own legislation. I think, Secretary Armitage, you said correctly what is most important is an attitudinal change. That comes about in a number of ways.

Number one, we do not proclaim or profess to have the kind of expertise to set forth in legislation exactly the way things ought to go. We do not have that kind of background.

What we do have is an opportunity to vent a lot of ideas which I think is helpful in overcoming opposition within any institution.

Congress does not like it any better when somebody else tells it how to do its business. A lot of people have played an important role, not the least of which is the press, the Armed Forces Journal, which has given people like myself and Dan Daniel and others the opportunity to vent these ideas to see if it cannot spark some sort of reaction, hopefully in a positive way.

I think that is what has been taking place. I think these changes are long overdue. They would not come about if we did not have a forum to vent these ideas to see if there is a reaction out there.

What we found when writing and talking about this issue is that there are a lot of people in the service today, and retired individuals, who say we have not been doing it right, we should change.

What we want to do is to talk with leaders like yourself, Mr. Secretary, to try to shape attitudes and overcome biases and institutional barriers. Basically we are on the same side. We want to have the best fighting force we can have.

If it takes our approach or your approach or something in between to accomplish that, we are all on the same side.

Admiral CROWE. It is not working as well as anybody would prefer, but it is working, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. There have been significant improvements made. My questions did not indicate there have not been. My questions were designed to let you know we are continuing to look at this.

I think the answer to my question with regard to Grenada was exactly what I expected to hear. It would be done differently and probably more efficiently than that earlier experience.

Admiral CROWE. We are laboring under that belief. I think it is a genuine one.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Mr. Chairman, you have done great service. You put daylight on the issue. It is not a dirty issue. Special Forces are not guys that run around and get into dirty wars. You have put it in daylight. You have made it okay to talk about it, okay to share ideas about it.

You have brought the full range of debate into the open. You have made very clear that their skills and talents are applicable across a wide range of things. I must tell you frankly we are in your debt for that.

I neglected to ask that my statement be submitted for the record.

Senator COHEN. Thank you both for coming.

Our next two witnesses will include Dr. Richard Shultz, Associate Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and Maj. Gen. Richard A. Scholtes, U.S. Army, retired, former Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command.

General, we welcome both of you.

Dr. Shultz, you may proceed first.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. SHULTZ, JR., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY

Mr. SHULTZ. First of all, let me say it is a pleasure to be here. I welcome the opportunity to present my views on what I think is a critical national security issue, low-intensity conflict, which I look at as a strategic problem, I understand, in north-south and east-west terms.

What I will try to do is to speak broadly about low-intensity conflict and then comment on the legislation.

Many management security specialists have concluded today and in the years ahead the most likely type of conflict that will threaten the United States in which United States will employ force does conflict at the low end of the spectrum. I would say over the last 15 years that has been the case. I do not see any evidence that this trend is going to change in the remainder of this decade or the decade ahead.

What is the United States response then in this 15-year period?

Well, at least for 10 of the 15 years the U.S. response was to ignore the problem. U.S. policy could be described as a unilateral commitment to refrain from involvement even when vital interests were at stake.

If you look on the other side, what was the Soviet Union doing, and I look at this east-west terms as well as north-south, during the same period I would suggest that the Soviets broadened and intensified the score of its involvement in low-intensity conflict.

In part I think this is due to the fact that they recognized that the United States would not be involved; after Vietnam, we had decided not to do this. I could comment in questions and answers on what the Soviet strategy looks like. It is quite complex, it is integrated and involves the use of a number of surrogates.

When the Reagan administration came in in 1981, one of the things they sought to do was develop a strategy and capability to respond to low-intensity threat. I would put stress on the word "development" because this policy appears difficult for many within the national security policy community as well as outside of it to construe as necessary or viable.

I think there is confusion over what is low-intensity conflict, what is the main manifestation of this threat challenging the United States.

Additionally, I think there is substantial opposition to those steps that the administration has taken. In part this can be due to the Vietnam syndrome, but I would not put all the blame there.

Andrew Krepinevich has written a very good book. In that book what he is saying is that the United States has always had an assertion to low-intensity conflict, that within the military there is a conventional mindset. Within both the military and civilian side, there is a strong impetus to subsume new missions under existing structures.

Now, I think additionally that our political system has a difficult time understanding these conflicts. If you look at our approach to force, to war, to international relations, one can see that. Now, what can we do about this?

I think one of the things we can do, to start, is that we can identify what are the principal manifestations of low-intensity conflict that will challenge the United States today and in the years to come.

It is surprising to me that after 6 years of Special Operations Force revitalization for low-intensity conflict that members of the administration and even members of the military still assert that to define the parameters of LIC, as they call it, remains a difficult, complicated problem. I personally do not think it is difficult.

I would suggest that there are three major low-intensity conflict missions that SOF has a role to play in, although SOF is not the only player in these missions.

One is called counterinsurgency. That means assisting friendly governments in preventing or defeating Communist insurgency movements, many of which are backed by the Soviet Union. There are a variety of things you do to accomplish that.

Something which is new and very controversial is the question of the anti-Communist resistance, assisting democratic resistance movements in countries that are now Marxist-Leninist, have come to that position with the help of the Soviet Union and now are allowing their territory to be used to promote other low-intensity conflicts in the region. That is a second mission.

The third is counterterrorism. That involves actions, both against terrorist groups and those states that either directly or indirectly sponsor this.

I think there are other SOF missions. You talk about drugs, and so on, but I think these are the big three that are identified. The Defense Department says that we cannot approach LIC in an ad hoc or disjointed manner and I agree with that. However, I would say that in terms of the development of doctrine, strategy, tactics and capability, for SOF in a LIC environment, that we have not proceeded all that far for 6 years.

For instance, the Army only now has agreed on a revised manual for low-intensity conflict. Many observers and insiders have argued that the services still do not regard SOF missions for LIC, for counterinsurgency and resistance and for counterterrorism as being of sufficient importance to cause them to reorient their thinking.

In my testimony I have tried to show how counterinsurgency and resistance and counterterrorism, things that we have done, where you can see our approach, has had to be ad hoc and disjointed. I will not go into these, but they are in my statement. There are a number of items under each.

Now, what I have stated thus far may seem all the more remarkable in light of the fact in the last number of years we are spending much more on Special Operations Forces. You heard this morning that we are going to spend \$116 billion. That is three times as much as we spent in 1981.

It raises the question if you look at what I have identified above, how is it possible to spend more and still not have the capabilities necessary to respond effectively to the primary low-intensity challenges.

The answer is that while we are spending more on SOF, it is not concentrated on recognition. SOF revitalization is focused to an important degree on force readiness and equipment to meet CINCs'

plans and services' responsibilities for conventional wartime preparation.

In other words, SOF fighting behind enemy lines in a general conventional war. In my estimation, that is very important. If there is conventional war, you had better get behind the lines and do something about the Soviet echelons. However, to focus just on this means that we are giving second priority to LIC missions which for SOF are going to be the kind of missions that they are most likely to be involved in.

I do not think they are hoping they are going to have to drop lines, the lines in Europe. Therefore, spending money is not necessarily an indicator of progress. If this money had been spent on SOF revitalization for LIC, I think things would be different.

The military use of conventional war understandably has a major contingency and SOF should support this. How should we go about fixing it? A perennial major SOF-LIC problem is command and control and lack of attention to planning. You hit right on when you talked about the attitude.

We develop a Special Operations Command, Joint Special Operations Command to deal with this in the last number of years. Yet, many tell you that these organizational changes have not resulted in military responding to the administration's often articulated concern over low-intensity conflict.

JCS has a new proposal which I learned about this morning and listening to it, it seemed to me that important changes, but incremental, the main difference, as I see it, includes a higher ranking general officer with more influence in the DOD process. Everything else seems to remain pretty much the same.

Is the unified command the solution? It may be part of the solution. I do not think it is a panacea. As I read the bill, some of the things that are in there seem pretty good, responsibility for joint doctrine, training, planning missions, resources.

I guess, as I understand it, the unified command would also maintain operationally manned groups of forces before deployment. As I also understand it, the unified command might make the SOF commander in the field, who is in charge of the SOF, a more representative player with the regional CINC. That does not mean that the CINC does not have overall control; they do.

But the SOF representatives would interact with the CINCs and with other agencies in the field in a more effective way. I would say that even a unified command will not solve the problem if you do not focus on SOF low-intensity conflict. Reorganization alone will not do that, reorganization without specifically designated requirements which are subject to accountability.

If you do not have that, I do not think you are going to step up completely to the problem. I do think the LIC problem is bigger than the military. The solution to the LIC problem lies beyond the Unified Military Command.

The proposed legislation has an Assistant Secretary for Defense for low-intensity conflict. I do not have any doubt that the Secretary of the Army Hith is a good man, but what this is going to do is make SOF and LIC more visible and on the civilian side that will accomplish the same thing I think you are trying to accomplish on

the military side of the unified command, make it visible, make it important, make it strategic.

As I understand the administration, they think low-intensity conflict is a strategic problem. So, the question is: Should on the civilian side SOF and LIC be an add-on to an existing person's responsibility?

That is something that you have to come to grips with. However, again, as with the unified command, reorganization alone or change in the wiring diagram will not necessarily solve the problem. The reorganization without specifically articulated requirements is inadequate.

That brings me to the final point of your bill and that is the NSC level. If low-intensity conflict is a political-military issue, it means that the players in this are not just OSD. The players can involve CIA, they can involve State, they can involve USIA, a number of agencies.

If you have an NSC group—you call it a board, I call it a group, the same thing—what you are doing is you are taking a low-intensity conflict and the principal threat, as I have articulated them, and you say the quickness at the NSC level will make this the strategic issue and this special group which would have representatives from the appropriate agencies will play the central role in identifying our policy, identifying our strategy and in the requirements.

If they do all that, you as a committee can go back and check them to see if they are doing this and make them accountable, and you have oversight over this. Then you begin to come to the crux of the problem. You take it and you put it where I would put it because I happen to look at a low-intensity conflict—I studied these things for a number of years now—and I see it is a principal threat in the regions, but with the big east-west dimensions to it because of the SOF role.

So, I will stop with that.

Thank you.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

I guess we could not disagree that the budget will not change things and reorganization will not change things. The change will be an attitudinal one.

The question is: How do we bring this about? This hearing on the proposed legislation is designed to do that. There have been some significant changes. I am not entirely satisfied with what DOD has proposed to date, but it is a long way from where they were 6 months ago. Hopefully, we will be further along the line within 6 months following the House-Senate Conference.

You mentioned that this is not simply a military problem. It is a political problem as well.

One of the limitations that we insisted upon in El Salvador was no more than 55 military trainers. That was done for political reasons here in the U.S. Congress. They did not want Vietnam revisited. So, they put a limitation of no more than 55. That is working out well, as a matter of fact, for a different reason.

Those in the Special Operations Forces felt we should not have a large number of people there for the very reason if we allowed a conventional military buildup, you would have all the repercussions flowing from that.

Then you would have the problem of the local population seeing this as an American war rather than El Salvador's war. For different reasons, we are coming out to the right conclusions: a limited number of military advisers, training people to defend themselves against the Communist insurgency.

Mr. SHULTZ. Part of what low-intensity strategy would do would be preemptive. We talk today about doing another Grenada quickly. I think when you are talking about counterinsurgency, you are talking about preemption. Therefore, you need an organization that can identify problem areas before you are in a serious situation.

We have been in a serious situation in the south where the advisers are doing a good job. Some have argued that there is a bit too much of preparing the El Salvador Army in the mirror image of the U.S. Army.

I understand that there are some studies in the Department of Defense, taking a hard look at that. We do not want to go too far down the conventional route or preparing a force to be a mirror image of our own force. That is a danger.

These are political-military wars. The Communists call it a war of national liberation. It means that there are political-military solutions to this. Military alone cannot do this. That is for certain.

I had one thing I wanted to say at the very end and that is what Andrew Krepinevich had in his book, but in 1961 President Kennedy initiated a counterinsurgency—today we call it a low-intensity conflict-revolution within the U.S. Armed Forces in the national security bureaucracy which Krepinevich's book suggests is that the response of the services and national security bureaucracy was to co-op this interconventional structure, consequently defeating the goals of the administration.

That is why I stress you can create an apparatus that is good, but you want to be able to oversee it. If you take a look at El Salvador, you want to make sure those troops are being prepared to deal with the kind of force they are facing and not prepared in the way we would fight a war in Europe or elsewhere, and that is an important concern.

Senator COHEN. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Shultz, you have done a bit of study in this whole area.

Do you feel that the Israelis, British, and Germans, for example, are superior to us in their organization, command and control and effectiveness in the use of Special Operations Forces?

Mr. SHULTZ. Senator, it depends on what you are talking about. If you are talking about rescue—

Senator EXON. Talking about what?

Mr. SHULTZ. Rescue, the answer is that they appear to have done a better job. We did not do so good in the rescue we attempted. Apparently some of the rescue we wanted to do recently, for instance, the *Achille Lauro*, there was a bit of a problem finding a plane and apparently there were problems in getting Special Operations Forces out to deal with the TWA.

In the counterterrorism area they are better prepared. In the area of counterinsurgency and in the area of support for resistance we are really out there on our own.

The British had an experience of counterinsurgency a long time ago. The French had some experience and that was a long time ago. I think in those areas I do not see them having it. More in the CP counterterrorist area.

Senator EXON. One last question which is not directly related, but I think is a concern.

Do I assume correctly that the Soviets have done much in this area?

Mr. SHULTZ. In the low-intensity area?

Senator EXON. Yes.

Mr. SHULTZ. I would say that the Soviets are the sputnik of this field. The Soviets, for example, have developed a tremendous organization for promoting insurgency movements around the world. In the 1970s they in their own literature, if you read their literature, they tell you that "We have won some very big victories." They almost gloat about it.

The area where the Soviets are developing new capability is in their own counterinsurgency. Once one of these movements come to power, like in Nicaragua or where they have to send in forces to hold the line as they did in Afghanistan, they are getting much more into the counterinsurgency area.

Now, their approach to counterinsurgency is different from ours, but we have different political systems. Nonetheless, they are developing the assets, intelligence and military, for their version of foreign internal defense which means helping Marxist-Leninist factions that come to power stay in power.

I would say they are doing quite a bit in this area in contrast to us. They have a range of surrogates that they use who do specialized things.

Senator EXON. Let us go back to a Grenada-type example. I do not want to revisit Grenada in particular, but I am trying to see what your feeling is with regard to Soviet special operations capability.

Do you think their capability to carry out a Grenada-type operation is superior to ours or less than our capability as of now?

Mr. SHULTZ. They would do it differently. Superior capability is relative to what you want to achieve. I think that they would go in and they would not have the kind of reservations we have about using force. We should have those because we are a democracy. They have the lift to get them there, especially for something small like Grenada.

If you take a look at how they reinforced the Cubans in Angola in the latter half of the seventies, you can see they can get their equipment to the forces there quickly.

Senator EXON. Do they have a special operation force such as those we are trying to build?

Mr. SHULTZ. It is a bit different, but they have it. It is house-built within the military and in the intelligence. These are sometimes called Spetznat Forces. The ones housed in intelligence have political-military missions. They have these things. I do suggest they have a doctrine and strategy.

If you take a look at that doctrine and strategy, it calls for the development of a range of forces, military, paramilitary, intelligence, psychological, to carry out these missions.

Yes, they do.

Senator EXON. Have they used them in Afghanistan?

Mr. SHULTZ. You bet they have.

Senator EXON. And they have been successful?

Mr. SHULTZ. They have not lost and they are not leaving.

Senator EXON. They have not lost, but are they winning?

Mr. SHULTZ. They have driven a third of the population out. They sort of approach low-intensity conflict and countersurgency from the Japanese point of view. We cannot do this.

The Japanese when they got involved in China dealing with guerrillas, their strategy was called Mao tse-Tung, has the phrase that guerrillas have to live off the people and makes an analogy between fish and water. The fish guerrillas have to live in the water. The Japanese strategy was called drain the water.

I think that is the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan, they will drain the water.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Shultz.

General Scholtes.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD A. SCHOLTES, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED), FORMER COMMANDER, JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

General SCHOLTES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have not prepared a formal opening statement. I have had an opportunity to review the House proposed reorganization as well as the Senate's. I have considerable difficulty with the House version, H.R. 5109, for several reasons, most of which I would prefer to cover in closed session, sir.

The Senate proposal, having had the experience of forming the Joint Operations Command and serving as Commander for the first 4 years of its existence, comes up closer to what we found during my tenure as Commander of JSOC we needed.

Although I must say I do not want to address the issues that Secretary Armitage addressed because it is at an echelon well beyond what I would like to discuss.

With your permission, I would propose to withhold my comments until we go to closed session because most of the experiences are of a classified nature.

Senator COHEN. Let me ask you a couple questions in open session.

One of the complaints that we hear quite consistently is that the commanders of the unified commands often do not understand the capabilities or indeed the limitations of Special Operations Forces that are assigned to their command.

I am wondering about your own perspective as someone involved in combat operations. What is your view of this?

General SCHOLTES. I think unified commanders, because they have within their staff section a Special Operations element, agency or SOC, used to be called several different things, now referred to as the SOC, have a pretty good handle on how they would employ Special Operations Forces, the Special Operations Forces in

particular, in a wartime environment because that is the primary emphasis on the unified command.

I felt that the unified command did not thoroughly understand nor appreciate the capabilities of the Joint Special Operations Command type forces. I felt that that is still prevalent today.

Now, you have to understand, sir, I am retired as of a month ago, so I cannot speak as to the last 30 days.

Senator COHEN. Any problem in your experience concerning Special Operations career advancement?

General SCHOLTES. We have stressed repeatedly over the years that the individuals who are assigned to the Special Operations elements of each of our services have to, by the nature of their selection, be pretty damn good soldiers, sailors, airmen or they would not be able to make the grade.

Unfortunately, as Secretary Armitage says, he has figures from the Army which show that their percentage of pickup is pretty good. I would say the percentage of pickup should be astronomical based on the selection criteria we put these people through, and it is not.

Senator COHEN. One of the objectives in trying to create an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Forces is to try to get an advocate within the system for resources. As you have heard, the DOD has come up with a proposal for a three-star general.

Will that be sufficient, in your judgment?

General SCHOLTES. I do not know all of the ramifications of the DOD proposal, to be quite honest, Mr. Chairman. I know that as a two-star and in command of the Joint Special Operations Command, I did not have enough leverage on the services to force the issue with regard to budgets and with regard to equipment procurements.

I am not sure that with a three-star this will change and I understand, talking to the JCS personnel, they envision a totally different budget consideration for this three-star command than they did for the two stars, Joint Special Operations Command.

Senator COHEN. I think that is all I have for you in open session. I am going to declare that we go into closed session and have the room cleared except for those people who have appropriate clearances.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in executive session.]

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